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Abstract
This paper relates to the macroeconomics of imperfect capital markets. In this framework, the
heterogeneity of agents, notably of borrowing firms, is a key element in the explanation of
interactions between financial intermediaries and borrowers facing a bankruptcy probability.
This probability is  usually introduced through exogenous stochastic factors in firms' revenue. In
this paper I pursue a more inherently informational approach which, even though all market
processes are deterministic, partly "endogenizes" the default probability as a consequence of
heterogeneous, privately-held price expectations across firms. Then I examine in detail the
credit transmission mechanism and its impact on the macroeconomic variables in an economy
with characteristics such as those in 1) to 5).
J.E.L. Class.: E44, E51 (keywords: Macroeconomics, Imperfect capital markets, Credit and
money)
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A MACROECONOMIC MODEL OF BANKRUPTCY
Introduction
This paper relates to the macroeconomics of imperfect capital markets, whose
main features can be summarized as follows (e.g. Greenwald-Stiglitz, 1987, 1990;
Gertler, 1988; Dimsdale, 1995; Ardeni et al., 1993; Tamborini, 1996):
1) Firms display heterogeneous unobservable characteristics, so that lenders may
not be perfectly informed on firms' ability to pay. Consequently the various financial
instruments whereby firms can raise means of payment are not perfect substitutes.
Decisions about employment and production are conditional on the cost and contractual
terms of the financial instruments available to firms.
2) "Credit is special", or "credit matters", in that it is the only source of means of
payment for classes of firms which have no access to the open market. The particular
nature of credit is that it forces the borrower and the lender to take account of the
probability of bankruptcy.
3) Monetary policy matters to the extent that the central bank is able to alter
"credit availability" to the economy (acting as regulator of, or as lender of last resort to,
commercial banks).
In this framework for macroeconomic analysis, the heterogeneity of agents,
notably of borrowing firms, is a key element in the explanation of interactions between
lenders and borrowers. Relatedly, the causes and consequences of bankruptcy play a
crucial role in explaining firms' behaviour and the whole macroeconomic process.
These are major merits of the macroeconomics of imperfect capital markets. Whereas
firms' fallibility is virtually ignored in standard macroeconomics,  it is widely held
among economists and businessmen that bankruptcy is the key social device whereby
inefficient units are replaced by efficient ones in the competitive allocational process.
There is also evidence, and a related large literature on corporate management, that
businessmen do care about the eventuality of bankruptcy and the ensuing corporate as
well as personal costs (see e.g. White, 1989; Altman, 1984).
Agents heterogeneity is closely connected with the study of bankruptcy. A trivial
reason is that  not all firms go bankrupt. To grasp heterogeneity,  bankruptcy probability
is usually introduced into the economy through exogenous stochastic factors specific to
each firm's revenue whereby some firms default on their debt whereas others do not (see
3e.g. Greenwald-Stiglitz, 1990, 1993). What makes this practice widely accepted is
perhaps that it does not conflict with the principle that rational agents exploiting all
available information correctly can only commit random errors. The advantage of
considering bankruptcy under this assumption  is recognition that a random error may
be so large as to drive the agent out of the market. However, this analytical short-cut,
though convenient,  treats bankruptcy as pure misfortune and excludes any relation
between bankruptcy and firms' behaviour or the macroeconomic process. By contrast,
the business community and its ethics are built upon the principle of the entrepreneur's
responsibility -though the unsuccessfull entrepreneur may be ready to blame his/her
misfortune1.
In this paper I shall pursue a more inherently informational approach to
bankruptcy based on heterogeneous, privately-held price expectations across firms. In
other words, firms differ ex ante in their expected prices rather than being discriminated
by a random mechanism ex post. A few words about the relevance of heterogenous
price expectations is perhaps in order - though the relevance or realism of hypotheses is
not a major concern in modern economics. Heterogenous expectations may be regarded
as no more than a curiosum from the viewpoint of a world with full information. Yet a
well-known theoretical point is that the free full-information assumption hardly fits into
the standard model of competitive markets with private ownership of resources. Indeed,
a requisite for ex-ante heterogeneity is simply that "all available information" is not  a
free good, but is instead partitioned between private information beloging to each firm,
which is not freely observable by the others, and public information, which is freely
observable by everybody (see also Pesaran, 1987, ch.3).  Also worth considering is the
evidence from business surveys of persistent and remarkably stable differences in price
forecasts across respondents over time, under different inflationary regimes (e.g. pre- as
well as post-oil-shocks of the 1970s), in different countries, and in spite of the large and
cheap diffusion of the results of business surveys themselves (see e.g. Visco, 1984;
Pesaran, 1987, ch.8)2. These surveys do not explain why price expectations may differ,
                                          
1Some penetrating considerations on entrepreneurial risks and capabilities were put forward by Knight
(1921).
2In the case of the Italian manufacturers and experts surveyed by the Mondo Economico opinion poll on
6-months-ahead expected price changes from 1952 to 1980, Visco (1984) detected a stable standard
deviation of forecasts ranging between 1.5% and 3% (amounting between 1/2 and 1/1 of the mean) for all
categories of prices and respondents. Notably, the standard deviation peaked well above 3% in 1972-73,
in connection with the analogous peak in inflation expectations after the oil price jump. Pesaran's (1987)
data from the Confederation of British Industries Survey from 1958 to 1986 do not provide the standard
deviation of price expectations, but an indirect statistics of the degree of heterogeneity of opinions in the
population of respondents can be obtained by computing the mode of the frequencies of replies in the
three classes provided by the questionnaire ("up", "down", "the same"), after normalizing for the N/A
4and such differences may be due to a variety of reasons, not only or even not mainly
genuinely different opinions, but also some degree of inaccuracy or fuzziness in replies.
In any case, as Laidler and Parkin wrote in a celebrated survey on inflation,
What precisely is the expected rate of inflation, is this a unique variable or may several
measures of it coexist? And if they do, what consequences flow from differences
between expectations? (1975, p.770)3
Questions such as these have received too little attention since the inception of the
"rational expectations revolution".
The ex ante heterogeneity of firms in their expected prices partly relates the
bankruptcy probability of a firm to its own characteristics, and partly  "endogenizes"  it
in the macroeconomic process. As will be explained below, in a population of firms
with heterogeneous price expectations, a class of firms -whose expected price exceeds a
threshold value that depends on the characteristics of the population itself- is bound to
default on debt. Of course, in reality firms may go bankrupt for many more, perhaps less
abstract, reasons. However, the model presented here only seeks to show that
introducing heterogeneous price expectations into an otherwise perfectly competitive
economy can be sufficient to generate a "bankruptcy mechanism" which is not trivially
detectable by each single firm. This in turn introduces substantial differences into
macroeconomic analysis with respect to the standard methodology, firstly in the
macroeconomic equilibrium results for a given distribution of expected prices in the
population of firms, and secondly in the modifications of macroeconomic equilibria if
one allows for changes in the distribution of expected prices, e.g. as a consequence of
learning cum bankruptcies.
The first three sections of the paper cover the first issue. Section 1 describes the
structure of the economy, in particular imperfect capital markets, "fully equity rationed"
firms, credit as the sole supply of funds, and heterogeneous price expectations. Section
2 derives the optimal plans of firms and workers in the economy. Sections 3 shows the
macroeconomic equilibrium results for the three markets of labour, credit and output,
and examines in detail the bankruptcy mechanism generated by this economy. Section 4
_____________________________
option. Here again this statistics reveals a substantial persistence of heterogeneity, the mode of replies
ranging between 50% and 80% over the whole period, but never exceeding this value, not even in the
years of high price stability up to 1970. Another similarity with the results presented by Visco is that the
mode of replies fell to a minimum of 50% just in the period of the inflation peak of 1972-73, indicating a
population split exactly between the "up" and "same" forecast.
3As quoted in Visco (1984, p.223).
5offers a preliminary discussion of the second issue mentioned above, which is largely
unexplored in the literature, namely the effects on the macroeconomic equilibrium of
changes in the characteristics of the firms' population due to attempts to learn the price-
generating process, on the one hand, and bankruptcies that drive some firms out of the
market on the other. Section 5 summarizes the results and points out open issues for
further research.
1. Structure of the economy
Let us consider an economy where firms produce competitively one single non-
storable consumption good, called "the output" of the economy, by means of
homogeneous labour and a decreasing-return technology. Absent physical capital, there
is only private organization of production ("firm") in this economy, and each firm is run
by a single manager who is entitled to profits and losses. All firms have the same
operation cycle with two stages: production and sales.  The production stage takes one
discerete period indexed with t, regardless of the scale of output, while the sale stage
takes place in t+1 and is virtually instantaneous. Therefore, at the beginning of each t all
firms demand labour as a function of the output planned for sale in t+1, while they sell
the output produced in t-1, and so on as in the chart below:
[Figure 1]
Unlike in traditional macroeconomics, in the class of models considered in this
paper the time structure of transactions and the structure of contracts among economic
agents are of great importance as they impinge upon the functioning of markets and of
the whole economy. In particular, the time structure of transactions is such that firms
need an amount of means of payment (at least) equal to their wage bill for each t. This
requirement by firms, which disappears in standard macroeconomic models based on
simultaneous transactions on all markets, is viewed as a key ingredient in the
macroeconomics of credit (e.g. Blinder-Stiglitz, 1983; Blinder, 1987; Greenwald-
Stiglitz, 1987).
In order to accommodate this factor in the model I posit  the following
characterizing assumptions:
(A1) There exists a general means of payment in the form of fiat money issued by a
government agency called "the central bank". Interest-free money is the only asset in the
economy.
6(A2) Workers and firms stipulate "standard labour contracts", that is to say, contracts in
terms of money which are resolved through payment by the end of the operation cycle.
(A3) The central bank operates a credit window at the beginning of each t. Any
borrower j receives the contractual amount of credit Bjt against his commitment to pay
Bjt(1 + Rt) < Kjt in t+1, where Rt  is the bank nominal interest rate and Kjt denotes the
borrower's personal resources4.
(A1) and (A2) are implied by each another, and they can be taken to represent
imperfect capital markets. In fact, one might design labour contracts like private
securities and the wage rate as their price5, in which case (A1) and (A2) would drop
together. The latter would be viewed as a case of perfect capital markets, with workers
in a position of suppliers of firms' (working) capital. Hence (A1) and (A2) amount to
assuming, loosely speaking, that firms are "fully rationed on the equity market" (see e.g.
Greenwald-Stiglitz, 1990, 1993).
Under "full equity rationing", a firm may finance its wage bill either from
internal funds or by borrowing on the credit market. (A3) states the credit conditions for
those firms which resort to borrowing. The ensuing monetary regime is one where the
central bank pegs the interest rate and the market determines the quantity of money
supply, which is otherwise known as the "endogenous money" model (see e.g. Kaldor,
1982; Moore, 1988; King-Plosser, 1984)6.
In this economy, the firms resorting to credit face a bankruptcy risk impinging
on the manager. Following (A3), if firm j borrows Bjt = (1 - θjt)StLjt, where θ is the
self-financed fraction of the wage bill,  St the contractual money wage rate, and Ljt the
labour input, the manager's earnings scheme will be the following:
(A4) St   in t
Zjt+1 if Zjt+1 > 0
} in t+1
   Zjt+1 -kjtBjt(1+Rt) if Zjt+1 < 0
where Zjt+1 = Pjt+1Y(t)jt+1 - StLjt(1 + (1-θjt)Rt) is profit, Y(t)jt+1 is the output
produced in t and sold in t+1, Pjt+1 is the selling price,   Zjt+1 < 0 is a state of
                                          
4The borrower's personal resources cannot be traded directly for working capital, which is another
implication of imperfect capital markets. The fact that borrowing cannot exceed the borrower's personal
resources ensures that the central bank bears no risk whatsoever.
5For instance, each worker in t receives from the hiring firm St labour bonds for unit of labour services;
each labour bond will be convertible into the consumption good in t+1 at the market price.
6For an extension of this model to a competitive credit market see Tamborini (1995).
7bankruptcy, and kjtBjt(1+Rt)  is the incidence of the bankruptcy procedure on the
manager's personal resources.
(A4) introduces bankruptcy risk into the firm's decision making as a
consequence of  "equity rationing". In fact, the manager is paid at the market price of
labour, and then seizes the firm's whole profit, if positive, or deducts the firm's
outstanding liability from his personal resources. In addition, the bankruptcy procedure
typically entails costs that are assumed to be proportional to the value of the firm's
debt7. Full payment of profits and interests also implies that the firm's revenue is always
exhausted, so that θjt = 0 for all j and t.
We now need an explanation of why bankruptcy may occur, and possibly a
probability measure of it. First of all,  we are obviously not interested in situations
where all firms either go bankrupt or  make profits; in other words, we need an
economy where firms may differ in their performance. Indeed, the heterogeneity of
agents, as opposed to the representative agent methodology, is central to the new micro-
and macroeconomics of credit and bankruptcy (e.g. Greenwald-Stiglitz, 1987; Stiglitz,
1991). Heterogeneity may be introduced ex post -i.e. as (stochastic) differences in firms'
realizations- or ex ante -i.e. as differences in firms' plans8. I shall follow this latter way,
stressing an inherently informational aspect of bankruptcy risk through the following
assumption:
(A4) Let all agents observe the vector of current market prices at any t. Henceforth,
Pe(t)jt+1 and Pe(t)wt+1 will be the privately held expected output price of the firm j
and of the worker w conditional on the public information available at t. Given a
continuum of firms and workers, let ft(Pe(t)jt+1) and gt(Pe(t)wt+1) be the density
functions of the expected prices across firms and workers, respectively.
(A5) Given ft(Pe(t)jt+1) and gt(Pe(t)wt+1), in each t there exists an average expected
price in the economy Pe(t)t+1, conditional on the information available at t, i.e.
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 This personal component of costs is distinctive of the manager's liability in the firm due to debt finance
as opposed to a fully equity-financed firm, where  kjt > 0 (see Greenwald-Stiglitz, 1993). The Greenwald-
Stiglitz macro-model, however, does not specify the debt contract between the manager and the bank and
assumes a positive cost of bankruptcy as an increasing function in the firm's output. The authors put
forward a number of justifications for this assumption, though perhaps the most important argument is
that "having bankruptcy costs depend on [output] is necessary in order to ensure that the possibility of
bankruptcy is never ignored" (p.89).  (A4) shows that this may be the case with kjt > 0. An alternative
strategy would be to let the bankruptcy probability increase with output (see also Greenwald-Stiglitz
(1993), p.86, and below, fn. 10).
8
 The Greenwald-Stiglitz (1993) model is an example of the former type,  since each firm ex post faces an
individual selling price which is a stochastic deviation from the output average market price. Therefore, it
seems that an imperfect output market is also assumed. This additional imperfection is unnecessary if
firms heterogeneity is introduced ex ante as shown above.
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(A4) amounts to introducing a partition between (homogeneous) public and
(heteregeneous) private information. At this stage of analysis the causes of different
expected prices are not important: thay can be thought of as a product of genuine
heterogeneous beliefs on the economy, or as the result of whatever firm-specific
computation or measurement error. The individual expected price is also representative
of the firm's project (in a competitive market, with a decreasing-return technology there
is a one-to-one map from the expected price to the optimal planned output), so that we
may also say that each firm's project is not observable ex ante either9. (A5) states that
the average expectation of firms and workers is the same, and that it turns out to
coincide with the actual price.The first part is only a simplifying assumption that
prevents phenomena that may arise at the aggregate level from introducing further
differences in the average expected price of firms and workers. Though potentially
interesting, these phenomena fall outside the scope of the present paper. The second part
amounts to a "population's rational expectations hypothesis", in the sense that price
expectations are "on average correct", where the average is taken across the population
of agents. This hypothesis is held in order to focus on the role of heterogeneity of
expectations at the individual level, though it is admitted that the population of agents
cannot be systematically wrong as a whole.10
                                          
9This partition between public and private information is now common in models of heterogeneous
information; moreover, the existence, at least ex ante, of private, unobservable information should be
understood as a typical feature of competitive markets where all agents are "small" and ignore each other.
On this issue see also Pesaran (1987, ch.2).
10Assumptions (A4) and (A5) give a representation of the price expectations economy-wide which seems
close in its substance to the evidence reported by major studies on business surveys. Carlson-Parkin
(1975) in their path-breaking work on measuring inflation expectations from business surveys introduced
the practice of assuming individual expectations in the economy to be distributed according to a given
density function (they also assumed that each individual has his/her own distribution from which his/her
responses are drawn, but this further assumption would only complicate our setup). Visco (1984),
examining the opinion poll of the Italian magazine Mondo Economico, and Pesaran (1987, ch.8), using
the data from the business survey of the Confederation of British Industries, both applied the same
methodology under alternative specifications of the hypothetical density functions of expectations. The
Mondo Economico opinion poll is elaborated jointly with the Italian official Institute for Conjunctural
Analysis (ISCO), whose methodology is again based on the assumption of distributed expectations in the
economy (see D'Elia, 1991). The tendency of price expectations to be "correct on average" was found by
Visco, though limitedly to the period before the oil shocks of the 1970s. Pesaran instead rejected the
"populations's rational expectations hypothesis".
9Given (A3) and (A4), a bankruptcy state of firm j occurs whenever it defaults on
its bank debt, i.e. when Pjt+1 < Vjt,  where Vjt = StLjt(1 + Rt)/Y(t)jt+1 is the average
cost of producing Y(t)jt+1. Given that Pe(t)jt+1 > min(Vjt+1) is the market entry
condition, bankruptcy occurs if the firm's expected price turns out to be higher than the
actual output price, and the actual output price  is lower than the firm's average cost. In
particular, let
Φjt ≡ Prob(Pjt+1 < Vjt)
be the probability of the default state for the firm, and φjt its estimated value by the
firm. Therefore, kjtStLjt(1 + Rt)φjt is the manager's expected bankruptcy cost.
2. Individual plans
2.1.  Firms
It is assumed that managers are risk-neutral and wish to maximize earnings over
their plain wage. Given the above time structure of production and transactions,
however, a manager has to plan production in period t whereas sales and profit will
materialize in period t+1. From (A4) and (A5),  the j-th manager's expected earnings as
of t will be11:
(2.1) E(t)jt+1 = St +  [Pe(t)jt+1Y(t)jt+1 - StLjt(1 + Rt)(1 + kjφjt)]
Hence, the firm's programme is:
(2.2) maxL E(t)jt+1
given the production function
(2.3) Y(t)jt+1 = Lηjt
for all firms, with 0 < η < 1.
As usual, it is convenient to compute the log-linear solution of the firm's
programme, which  yields the following labour demand function (unless otherwise
stated, the log of each variable will be denoted by converting the notation from capital
to small-case letters):
(2.4) ljt = d  - g(ϕjt + st + rt - pe(t)jt+1)
  
with        δ η
η
γ
η
ϕ φ=
−
=
−
= + = +
log
, , log( ), log( )
1
1
1
1 1jt jt jt t tk r R
Equation (2.4) displays some typical features of the models of firm with credit
(e.g. Greenwald-Stiglitz, 1990, 1993). First, because of the time lag between production
                                          
11See also Greenwald-Stiglitz (1993), equation (13)
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and sale, the firm's employment decision is ruled by its expected real marginal cost (the
term in brackets), not the current one. Second, the real marginal cost includes the bank
interest rate rt and the expected bankruptcy cost ϕjt ∈ [0, ∞], bankruptcy risk for short,
which increases as φjt or kjt increase. That is to say, an increase in the estimated default
probability or in personal bankruptcy costs induces the manager to reduce employment
and output. On the other hand, (2.4) becomes the standard labour demand function when
rt = 0, φjt = 0 or kjt = 0.
From (2.4) we see that the individual labour demand may differ according to the
firm's expected price and bankruptcy risk. It will be convenient to work with average
functions as representative of the market. To this effect we can exploit (A5) to obtain
(2.5)  ldt = d - g(ϕt + st + rt - pe(t)t+1)
where pe(t)t+1= logPe(t)t+1, and ϕt is the average value of  the individual estimations
of the bankruptcy risk.
2.2.  Workers
Workers are assumed to choose rationally between leisure and consumption in a
competitive labour market. I shall adapt to the present context the general life-cycle
choice model elaborated by Lucas-Rapping (1969) and Sargent (1979), where a worker
w at any t is characterized by an individual system of preferences over the quantity of
leisure Hwt and of consumption Ywt in t and onwards, represented by the utility
function
(2.6) Ut(Hwt, Ywt, ...)
for all w, monotonically increasing  and twice differentiable in each argument, with Hwt
Î [0, H] and H as the social maximum working time.
Given the structure of transactions in the economy, the worker at the beginning
of time t observes the current price of output Pt, the contract money wage St and forms
the expected output price Pewt+1. Then he should choose how much labour to sell in
period t, and how to distribute his period-t labour income between t, when output
produced in t-1 is available, and t+1, when output produced in t will be available,
knowing that interest-free money is the only asset in the economy. The resulting utility
maximization problem is:
maxH,Y Ut(Hwt, Cwt, Cwt+1)
subject to
(2.7a) Lwt = H - H wt
11
(2.7b) PtCwt + Mwt = StLwt
(2.7c) Pewt+1Cwt+1 < Mwt
where Lwt is  labour supply in t, Mwt are money balances, and Cwt , Cwt+1 is
consumption in t and t+1.
Under the usual assumptions that leisure and consumption are nomal goods and
that an internal solution exists,  the Lucas-Rapping-Sargent model yields:
(2.8a) Lwt = Lw(St/Pt, Pewt+1/Pt)
(2.8b) Cwt = Yw(St/Pt, Pewt+1/Pt)
(2.8c) Cwt+1 = Mwt/Pt+1
with L'w1 > 0, L'w2 < 0, C'w1 > 0, C'w2 < 0. Note that  P
e
wt+1/Pt is 1 + the expected
inflation rate (expected inflation rate for short).
The worker's choice between leisure and consumption and between present and
future consumption is ruled by the current real wage rate and the expected inflation rate.
But the cross-elasticity between present leisure and future consumption is not nil: an
increase in Pewt+1 which raises P
e
wt+1/Pt amounts to a fall in St/P
e
wt+1, the
expected real wage rate, hence Lswt is decreasing in P
e
wt+1/Pt or else increasing in
St/P
e
wt+1.
Again following Lucas-Rapping and Sargent we may also assume that a log-
linear specification of (2.8a) exists and is the following:
(2.9) lwt = a + b1(st - pt) - b2qe(t)wt+1
where qe(t)wt+1 = pe(t)wt+1 - pt is w's expected inflation.
According to (2.9), the individual labour supply may differ in the expected
inflation. Using assumption (A5) as in the case of firms, we may obtain the average
labour supply as representative of the whole market:
(2.10) lst = a + b1(st - pt) - b2qe(t)t+1
where qe(t)t+1 = pe(t)t+1 - pt is the economy's average expected inflation
3. Heterogeneous expectations, bankruptcy risk and macroeconomic equilibrium
In the following parts of the paper I shall focus on the role of credit and
bankruptcy risk in determining the economy's macroeconomic outcomes. In particular, I
shall use this model economy to show that heterogeneous price expectations may be the
source of bankruptcy risk. Later in section 4 I shall discuss whether this kind of
heterogeneity may persist or not.
12
3.1. Macroeconomic equilibrium
First, recall that at the beginning of each new operation cycle t, the markets for
labour and credit determine the nominal wage rate st, the level of employment lt, and
the amount of credit lent to firms bt, given the current output price pt, the bank nominal
interest rate rt, the average bankruptcy risk ϕt, and the average expected price pe(t)t+1.
The labour demand and supply functions are those obtained in section 2 (2.5), (2.10),
and hence the labour market equation is
(3.1) d - g(ϕt + st + rt - pe(t)t+1) = a + b1(st - pt) - b2qe(t)t+1
The amount of credit is demand determined and is simply equal to the economy's
wage bill,
(3.2) bt = st + lt
which also corresponds to the period's money supply.
Subsequently, in the next period t+1  all firms can sell their output, and the
output market determines the equilibrium price. Output supply is
(3.3) y(t)t+1 = ηlt,
an amount fixed and non-storable. Output demand is given by equation (2.8c) in the
workers' optimization programme, that is, ct+1 = mt - pt+1 for all workers. Since mt =
bt = st + lt, the output market equation is
(3.4) ηlt = st + lt - pt+1
Under "population's rational expectations" according to (A5), the equilibrium
solutions of equations (3.1)-(3.4) for the real wage rate, ωt = st - pt, the real money
supply, µt = bt - pt , the level of output, y(t)t+1, and the inflation rate, qt+1 = pt+1 - pt,
are the following:
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(the coefficients display their sign underneath; their values are specified in the
Appendix; the intercepts, denoted with 'o' are omitted for brevity).
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3.2.  Credit, bankruptcy risk and output
The macroeconomic equilibrium is determined by two "financial variables", the
bankruptcy risk ϕt, as estimated on average by firms, and the nominal interest rate rt,
fixed by the central bank. We can first draw the following proposition concerning the
relationship between credit, bakruptcy risk and economic activity.
(P1)  The level of output is decreasing in the estimated bankruptcy risk and in the
nominal interest rate if  β1 > β2 (see Appendix)
(P1) can be interpreted as a non-neutrality proposition which is common to other
macroeconomic models of imperfect capital markets (see e.g. Greenwald-Stiglitz,
1988a, 1988b, 1990)12. Note, however, that this result is conditional on the relative
magnitude of the parameters of the labour supply function. The condition β1 > β2
reflects a sufficiently low intertemporal substitution effect, that is to say, labour supply
reacts more to changes in the current real wage than to changes in expected inflation13.
If this condition is met, the reason behind (P1) is simply that both financial variables
affect the real marginal cost of firms at a given expected price. To focus on the role of
the bankruptcy risk, suppose that ϕt rises.  Ceteris paribus,  the expected real marginal
cost for firms rises too, and labour demand  falls. Since it is assumed that workers and
firms on average correctly anticipate the deflationary impact of ϕt, this tends to lower
the nominal wage rate and the real marginal cost for firms. This exerts a positive
counter-effect on labour demand, which is  stronger the greater is  β2, and vice-versa. In
any case, it is certainly significant that the non-neutrality of the financial variables may
result, through the interest rate and the bankruptcy risk, even though price expectations
are (on average) correct, and markets are perfectly competitive14.
On empirical grounds, as is clear from equation (3.5c), ϕt lends itself to
straightforward interpretation as a source of aggregate supply shocks alternative to the
                                          
12However, it should be clear that (P1) does not imply per se that there may be involuntary
unemployment (the labour market does clear, the nominal and real wage rate being negative elastic to
changes in those same variables).
13In fact, Greenwald-Stiglitz (1993) obtain that output is always decreasing in the bankruptcy risk
because they model labour supply as a function of the current real wage only, which is equivalent β2 = 0
in the present model. On the other hand, the well-known full-neutrality result of the new classical theory
obtains if β1 = β2, which yields the typical labour supply function depending on the expected real wage
only. There seems to be no reason why one should subscribe to either of the two extreme versions of the
labour supply function.
14Thus, another idea of Keynes's (1936, ch. 19), that the mere downward flexibility of wages and prices
could generate no increase in employment and output, finds substantial support from consideration of
firms' liabilities and bankruptcy risk (e.g. Greenwald-Stiglitz, 1987). This issue, too, is not at all new in
the macroeconomic debate since it dates back to Fisher's theory of debt deflation: see e.g. Tobin (1980),
and Minsky (1982).
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technology/tastes shocks  preferred in the new-classical camp (Greenwald-Stiglitz,
1987, 1990, 1993; Gertler, 1988; Bernanke-Gertler, 1987). Shifts in aggregate supply
originating in yo or in ϕt would hardly be distinguishable on empirical grounds. Yet
some argue that technology/tastes shocks of the magnitude required to reproduce the
observed swings in output strain credibility, whereas the bankruptcy risk perceived by
firms is typically volatile. Last but not least, this factor is reminiscent of Keynes's
original view that business fluctuations are rooted in the instability of the entrepreneurs'
state of confidence (Greenwald-Stiglitz, 1987)15.
3.3.  Expected prices and the bankruptcy mechanism
So far, we have examined the macroeconomic consequences of firms' fallibility
and their related bankruptcy cost assuming that each firm has its own estimation of its
default probability on which the individual bankruptcy risk ϕjt is built. We have seen in
section 2.1 that the individual estimation of the default probability is based on the firm's
understanding that the actual output price may turn out to be lower than its expected
price Pe(t)jt+1 and lower than the average cost of the output level associated with
Pe(t)jt+1. Now, in the light of the macroeconomic results obtained above, we will be
able to examine the bankruptcy mechanism in detail revealing its systemic nature, that is
to say, the fact that the default probability of each single firm depends on the expected
prices distribution in the whole population of firms.
First, recall that the macroeconomic results in system (3.1) are in fact average
market values, as if they were produced by the interaction between the "average firm"
and the "average worker" representative of the  respective populations. As can be
checked in equation (3.4), the process of endogenous money creation in the economy is
such that the actual output price  Pt+1 is always equal to the average cost of producing
Y(t)t+1; hence, the "average firm", whose expected price coincides with the actual
price, makes neither profits nor losses - which is consistent with the free-entry
assumption of the model. Consequently, the defaulting firms are those that have
produced at an average cost greater than the "average firm's". Since all firms are equal
                                          
15Of course, in Keynes's view changes in the entrepreneurs' state of confidence are responsible for
aggregate demand instability. The shift of focus of this class of models from demand to supply is
theoretically and empirically important. The present model shows that the elasticity of output to the
"financial factors" is proportional to its elasticity to labour inputs h and to the elasticities of labour supply
b1and b2. The claim that this transmission mechanism from credit cost to output supply is likely to be
much stronger than the old-Keynesian one going through asset prices and the asset-prices elasticity of
output demand appears largely an empirical matter.
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except in their expected price, it also the case that the defaulting firms are those with
expected price i) higher than the population's average, and ii) higher than the marginal
cost of the "average firm". Therefore, whereas the average profit in the economy is
always zero, heterogeneous price expectations entail that it is always possible to sort out
three classes of firms so that
(1) Pe(t)jt+1 < Pe(t)t+1 = Pt+1, Zjt+1 > Zejt+1 > 0 [high profits]
(2) Pe(t)t+1 < Pe(t)jt+1 < P te t( ) +1 0 < Zjt+1 < Zejt+1 [low profits]
(3) Pe(t)jt+1 > P te t( ) +1 , Zjt+1 <  0 [default]
where  P te t( ) +1
 
is the expected price coincident with the marginal cost of the "average
firm".
The first class makes "high profits" in the sense that actual profits exceed the
expected ones. The second class makes positive profits, but lower than expected. The
third makes negative profits and defaults. This result can be better understood with the
help of figure 2, which represents the usual price-cost-output plane for the individual
firm and shows the three classes where the firm may fall at t+1 according to its own
expected-price-output choice at t
[Figure 2]
Point A denotes the "average firm's" expected-price-output combination. All firms
whose expected price exceeds P te t( ) +1  will produce at their marginal cost to the right
of Y(t)t+1, i.e. with an average cost greater than at point A and hence greater than the
actual price Pt+1, so that they will default.
Knowing the density function of expected prices in assumption (A5),
ft(Pe(t)jt+1), we can give a probability measure to each single class of firms:
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Therefore, the following proposition holds:
(P2) The individual default probability, understood by the firm as the probability that
the actual price falls below its own average cost, Φjt ≡ Prob(Pjt+1 < Vjt), is in fact
given by Γt ≡ Prob(Pe(t)jt+1 > P te t( ) +1 ) for all j. Hence it depends on the distribution
of expected prices in the population.
Let us now examine in greater detail how the characteristics of the distribution
of expected prices in the economy affect the  default probability in the economy. In
particular, let us focus on the first two moments of the distribution.  First of all, it
should be noted that the threshold value of bankruptcy P te t( ) +1  is itself a function of
the mean value of the distribution. In fact, P te t( ) +1  is the marginal cost of producing
the economy's optimal (average) ouput Y(t)t+1; hence we can write P te t( ) +1 (Y(t)t+1),
with ∂ P te t( ) +1 /∂Y(t)t+1 > 0. As can be deduced from equations (2.1)-(2.3), Y(t)t+1 is
in turn an increasing function of the average expected price Y(t)t+1(Pe(t)t+1),  ∂
Y(t)t+1/∂Pe(t)t+1 > 0. Consequently, it should be that P te t( ) +1 (Pe(t)t+1), with ∂
P te t( ) +1 /∂Pe(t)t+1 > 0. In particular, equations (2.1)-(2.3) yield the linear function:
(3.5) P te t( ) +1  = Pe(t)t+1/η2
 This relationship, with its feedback on the default probability, is reproduced in figure 3
for a hypothetical unimodal symmetric distribution.
[Figure 3]
Figure 3 highlights how the first two moments of the distribution determine
P te t( ) +1  and the default probability in the economy. First, consider the mean value
Pe(t)t+1: an increase in Pe(t)t+1 associated with a parametric shift of the whole
distribution to the right increases P te t( ) +1 . Since P te t( ) +1  increases more than
Pe(t)t+1, and the probability mass is left unchanged, the new default probability should
be smaller. Second, consider the variance of the distribution: a mean preserving spread
of the distribution that increases its variance determines a larger default probability.
Hence we may add the following new proposition:
(P3) The default probability in the economy decreases with the mean value, and
increases with the variance (mean preserving spread), of the distribution of the
expected prices in the firms' population.
Propositions (P2) and (P3) have several other implications that are worth
emphasizing. First, the above shows that heterogeneity of expectations is sufficient for
firms to face a positive probability of default even though firms are technically identical
and the price-generating process is deterministic. Default is, in this setup, simply a
matter of relative expected prices. The dependence of the default probability on the
characteristics of the distribution of expected prices in (P3) may pinpoint some popular
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views among businessmen, reflected in short-term business surveys and forecasts, such
as the view that a buoyant market with rising prices is less severe for profitability16, or
the view that greater uncertainty (heterogeneity) may bring about more mistakes and
losses17.
Second,  on methodological grounds the most important consequence of
considering heterogeneity behind "average behaviour" is that the usual argument that
the economy as a whole cannot be systematically wrong cannot be stretched to justify
the short-cut of assuming a perfectly informed representative agent. In fact, we have
seen that although the firms' population on average may have the correct price
expectation, each single firm may fail and should discount a bankruptcy risk, whereas
the "representative firm" in the standard methodology, anticipating the correct output
price, would not. Hence, the average estimated bankruptcy risk by firms appears in the
macroeconomic equilibrium values in system (3.1), whereas the standard methodology
would induce us to ignore it.
Third,  another important methodological problem arises in connection with the
correct estimation of  the default probability by the single firm. Statistically, this is a
problem analogous to the computation of the rational expectation of a stochastic
variable in that the agent is required to know the distribution of the variable. There are
also significant differences. The first is that in our case the agent should know the first
two moments of the distribution18, whereas in standard rational expectations
computations only the first moment is necessary. The second difference is that the
relevant variable is the expected price by the other agents, not directly a market
realization. The third is that as soon as the distribution of expected prices in the
economy became common knowledge, the bankruptcy mechanism would vanish, since
every firm would discover the average expected price. In othe words, a typical "beauty
                                          
16The literature on the negative effects of Fisher's "debt deflation" is also to be metioned here, with its
central message that inflation is beneficial to debtors. Generally, analyses in this vein focus on the stock
of outstanding debt, whereas I have focused on the default probability. Following the seminal works by
Minsky (1982), an explicit role for the debt stock can be found in the contributions of Bernanke (1983),
Bernanke-Gertler (1987), Greenwald-Stiglitz (1993).
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 A well-known piece of evidence shows that the variance of the price level increases with the inflation
rate. To the extent that this phenomenon is reflected in the degree of heterogeneity of price expectations,
the positive effect of inflation in reducing  bankruptcies may be dampened. Visco's (1984, pp. 57 ff.)
analysis of the Mondo Economico opinion poll detects a high degree of correlation (ranging from 0.67 to
0.8 under different measures) between upward inflation expectations and increase in their variance in the
population after the first oil shock. As Visco himself suggests, rising inflation alone may not be the cause
of increased uncertainty, unless this is perceived as a structural change in the economy.
18As explained above, the default probability Γt comes to depend on the mean and variance of the
distribution of expected prices in the economy.
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contest" problem is involved19, and the key question is whether each single firm has
access to the relevant information or not. Assumption (A4) introduced a distinction
between public, freely observable, information, and private, non observable,
information. This partition of information, which is basic to all models of heterogeneity,
implies in our setup that the single firm is prevented from collecting all the information
necessary to compute the distribution of expected prices with its characteristics. Thus
the bankruptcy mechanism hinges on limitedly informed firms, which does not mean
that they behave irrationally.
The present model provides an example of this general principle. Given
available information at the individual level, each profit-maximizing firm understands
that it should discount a bankruptcy risk due to its own default probability, i.e. the
probability Φjt that the market output price falls below its own average cost. Let us call
this "atomistic information". However, the fact that the default event will occur if the
firm's expected price exceeds the threshold value P te t( ) +1 , or that Φjt = Γt, is
completely hidden from its view. For this fact is the consequence of the whole
economy's aggregative activity of the heterogeneous plans of the firms that generates
the P te t( ) +1 (Pe(t)t+1) relationship reproduced in figure 320. Let us call this "systemic
information". At this point one may envisage two different theoretical routes. The first
is the one we have followed so far, that is, each firm only has "atomistic information",
proceeds on the basis of its own estimated value φjt of Φjt,  and the macroeconomic
equilibrium results reflect the average estimated bankruptcy risk ϕt as in system (3.1).
The second assumes that, perhaps by chance, the estimated value φjt by each firm turns
out to be equal to the correct Γt for all firms, which yields the "true" bankruptcy risk
measure to be placed in system (3.1). The two routes lead qualitatively to the same
result. In no case, however, can we assume that each firm is endowed with "systemic
information", unless we explain how private information is made freely observable in
the economy.
                                          
19A "beauty contest" problem arises whenever the rational choice of an agent depends on his knoweldge
of the choices made by all the others. As is well-known this term goes back to Keynes's analysis of stock
market traders in chapter 12 of the General Theory. This kind of problem arises whenever a system is
"self-referential", that is to say,  when the system's states depend on the collective anticipation of them.
The modern treatment of this class of problems, in the context of expectations formation, can be found in
Pesaran (1987, ch.4) and Sargent (1993).
20Hence, some would probably label these firms as "boundedly rational", since they are not only limitedly
informed about the economy's parameters set, but they also have limited understanding of the process that
generates the relevant market outcomes. On this point see again Pesaran (1987, ch.3).
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4. Can firms discover the bankruptcy mechanism?
The bankruptcy mechanism in-built in the present model is exclusively
informational, in that it originates from the limited "atomistic information" available to
firms, which prevents them from computing the distribution of expected prices in the
whole population. A natural question at this point is: How information-tight is the
bankruptcy mechanism? And, consequently, how persistent is the heterogeneity of price
expectations?21
To address these issues we should first of all examine how much "systemic
information" can be obtained by each single firm. In principle we know that information
can accrue to an individual  i) through the individual's activity (which leads to enlarging
one's private information), or ii) through the activity of a collective device or institution
(which makes information a public good).  A typical example of activity i) is learning
by doing, and of activity ii) the market or public economic agencies. Moreover, the two
informational sources can interact, with e.g.  public agencies helping individuals to
learn through their market activity. Though at present I am unable to add a detailed
model of information acquisition to the model of section 3, in this section  I shall
explore its potential role and consequences under three basic points: i) existence and
stability of the rational expectation of the inflation rate, ii) incentives to learn, iii)
interaction between learning and bankruptcy.
4.1.  Learning through the market
An intriguing feature of the bankruptcy mechanism of section 3 is that the
"atomistic information" at firms' hands is not wrong, it is simply spurious. Indeed, a
firm's ability to reduce its default probability need not result from a correct
understanding of the existence of the threshold expected price P te t( ) +1 , but more
simply from its accuracy in forecasting the actual output price. This is also perhaps the
more natural way a manager may perceive the problem. Therefore, an apparently
obvious point to start from seems to examine whether a firm can learn to infer the
correct value of qt+1 from the  information available at t.  However, the problem of
individual learning, the ability of a single firm to approach the "average firm" in a large
population, is almost irrelevant. The truly relevant problem is whether the whole
                                          
21If one looks at the evidence coming from business surveys recalled in the Introduction, one should
rather rephrase the above question asking why the heterogeneity is persistent.
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population of firms can, through learning, collapse onto the "average firm's"
expectation. Yet we should also be aware that changes in the population's expectations
have macroeconomic effects. This is a key issue as far as learning is concerned.
In the model of section 3 it was assumed that the population of firms on average
has the correct expectation of the inflation rate. System (3.5) resulted from solving the
demand-supply equations (3.1)-(3.4) for qe(t)t+1 = q(t)t+1. The inflation equation
(3.5d), in particular, resulted from
(4.1) qt+1 = q'0 - q''1(rt - ϕt) + q'1qe(t)t+1
with q''1 = [1 + β1(1 - η)]-1.
This equation shows that, as long as the "population's rational expectation" is not
established,  the actual inflation rate depends on its average expectation in the economy.
In other words, the economy under examination is a "self-referential system"22. A
system of this kind raises thorny problems as to expectations formation and learning, on
cognitive, theoretical and empirical grounds.
The first step is to assess the existence of a rational expectations solution for
equation (4.1), i.e. a solution for qe(t)t+1 = q(t)t+1. This solution exists and has already
been given in  equation (3.1d). Technically, this solution procedure amounts to finding
the fixed point of the map qe(t)t+1 → q(t)t+1. In a learning problem, however, the sole
existence of the fixed point is not sufficient. Suppose the firms' population starts far
away from the fixed point: since learning is intriniscally a dynamic phenomenon, we
need the fixed point to be an "attractor" in the map qe(t)t+1 → q(t)t+1, or in other
words, to be dynamically stable.
This second step of analysis is particularly hard because it is necessary to
introduce a motion law of qe(t)t+1. The standard line of argument is as follows. As long
as qe(t)t+1does not coincide with qt+1, there must operate a revision rule of qe(t)t+1.
This rule is generally assumed to be a map I(t) → qe(t)t+1, where I(t) is the information
set available at t.
 The motion law of qe(t)t+1 is nothing but a representation of the learning
process in the economy. An interesting, albeit uncomfortable, feature of the state of the
art is that there exist many conceivable learning processes. On the other hand,  the
modeller's choice is bounded by two criteria: rationality and/or cognitive capacity.
Ongoing research in post rational-expectations economics revolves around the mutual
consistency and interaction of these two criteria. Those who particularly stress
rationality assume learning processes based on statistic methods, such as bayesian
learning, least squares learning, etc. (see the works surveyed by Pesaran, 1987, ch.3;
                                          
22See fn.19
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Sargent, 1993). Those who are concerned with the cognitive feasibility of learning
processes instead draw on cognitive tools such as genetic algorithms, classifier systems,
neural networks (Arthur, 1991; Miller-Holland, 1991; Moss-Rae, 1992; Sargent, 1993).
One of the simplest examples of learning process is the case of homogeneous
"static expectations", i.e.
(4.2) qe(t)jt+1 = qt, all j
This is a special case in which I(t):  {qt}. Consequently, one obtains a dynamic map qt
→ qt+1, whose stable steady state values also ensure convergence and stability of the
motion law of qe(t)t+1. In fact, substitution of this equation into (4.1) leads to a first-
order linear difference equation for qt+1. Since q'1 < 1, we can say the following:
(P4) If  qe(t)t+1 = qt, the learning procees is convergent and stable for any intial value
qe(t)t+1 ≠ qt+1.
Though based on a very specific, and arbitrary, assumption, the resulting
dynamics of inflation contains a typical feature of economies under learning processes,
namely that the learning process itself modifies the macroeconomic results. In the mind
of the economy's creator there is no structural relationship between  qt+1 and qt, nor is
there a dynamic adjustment process to inflationary shocks. Learning by itself may create
such a relationship, and once it is established it would be irrational to ignore it.
However, P4 is far from conclusive. From both the rationalist and cognitive
viewpoints, the case of  static expectations is seriously limited. Unless the relevant
variable follows a pure random walk,  static expectations ignore information that can be
contained in contemporaneus variables that co-determine the relevant future variable23.
This is exactly the case of equation (4.1), which contains at least one freely observable
variable, the interest rate rt , to which qt+1 is correlated. The class of "boundedly
rational" learning models (Pesaran, 1987, ch.3) assumes that agents exploit all available
public information contained in reduced-form equations of relevant variables in order to
form and revise expectations on these variables, according to recursive least-squares
estimations. In our case, at any time t, given the information set I(t):  {qt-τ, rt-τ}, with τ
= 0, 1, ..., for all firms,
  
the equation to be estimated by each firm, taken from (4.1), is:
                                          
23In the cognitive approach, human beings draw expectations from "mental models", which are
representations of relationships between "objects" based on experience. There is close affinity between
this view, and the idea of agents as "economic modellers" popularized by the rational-expectations
school. The two schools differ sharply as to the content, extension and elaboration of mental models, and
in particular the cognitive school denies that mental models can ever be an isomorphic representation of
"reality" - whatever this word means (Tamborini, 1997). Beltrametti et al. (1996) have shown that a
classifier system - one of the most powerful learning computer-models based on the cognitive principle of
mental models - is indeed able to exploit information on exchange-rate theoretical "fundamentals"  to
predict exchange-rate changes profitably, whereas most statistical studies do not reject the random-walk
hypothesis and thus lead to ignore fundamental variables.
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(4.3) qt+1 = q'0 - q'1rt + εt
which yields
( . ) ( ) ~ ( ) ~ ( )4 4 1 0 1              qe t q t q t rtt+ = −
where (∼) denotes OLS estimators at t. Substituting (4.4) into (4.1) we obtain the new
inflation equation:
(4.5) qt+1 = q0(t) - q1(t)rt - q'1ϕt
where q(t)0= q'0 + q'1 ~( )q t 0 , q(t)1 = q'1(1 + ~( )q t 1 ).
Let us note the following two essential features of least-squares learning. First,
as already stressed, the learning process alters the inflation equation: the parameters in
equation (4.5) have a time index and, generally, differ from the structural ones in
equation (3.1d). Moreover, this alteration  is a cumulative process, since the data
generated by the inflation equation (4.5) will feed new estimated parameters in t+1,
which in turn will alter the inflation equation for t+2, and so on and so forth.  Second,
the estimation equation (4.3) mistakes the unknown variables ϕt and qe(t)t+1 as a
stochastic error term, which leads to inconsistent estimated parameters. The forecast
error implied by the above estimation procedure is:
(4.6) qe(t)t+1 - qt+1 = [ ~ ( )q t0 (1-q'1) - q'0] + [ ~ ( )q t1 (1-q'1) - q'1]rt + q'1ϕt
which is not orthogonal. Moreover, the fact  that in this case two unknown variables are
missing from the public information set prevents firms from inferring them through
error analysis. This reassures us that the problem for each firm to discover  qe(t)t+1 is
not trivial.
In spite of the above limitations, "boundedly rational" least-squares learning may
still be "successful", in the sense that forecast errors may tend to become smaller and
smaller through time (weak convergence). In our case, this occurs if
limt→∞ ~ ( )q t0 = q'0/(1-q'1), limt→∞ ~ ( )q t1  = q'1/(1-q'1)
which also implies limt→∞ ϕt = 0. Yet, from (3.5d), it is easy to see that q'0/(1-q'0)=
q0, and q'1/(1-q'1) = q1, that is to say, if the learning process displays weak
convergence, it also converges to the structural parameters of the inflation equation
(3.5d) and is therefore consistent with the rational expectations equilibrium (strong
convergence). Note that this may not be necessarily the case: the learning process might
not converge at all, or it might converge to parameters that are (permanently) modified
with respect to the structural ones. Which of the three outcomes will prevail crucially
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depends on the estimation and revision procedure that generates the sequence of
estimated parameters24.
4.2.  Learning in a heterogeneous population
Introducing heterogeneity and bankruptcy poses supplementary problems. First
of all, one faces the usual aggregation problem. As is the case in equation (4.1), the
actual inflation rate depends on the average expected inflation rate in the economy,
whereas individual expectations are distributed around the latter. We cannot simply
assume a law of motion of qe(t)t+1 as if this were a value held by all firms and all firms
adopted exactly the same learning process, otherwise for any qe(t)t+1 > qt+1 all firms
would go bankrupt25. Thus we should examine learning in a heterogeneous population,
where individual differences around the average forecast can persist.
If we accept the simplifying assumption that firms adopt the same learning
process represented by the least-squares estimation procedure presented above, it is not
difficult to transform the estimated equation (4.4) from a single-valued forecast into a
distribution of individual forecasts, in line with our previous assumption (A5) in section
2,  provided that we also assume that each firm introduces an individual element,
whether in the estimated parameters or as an additive disturbance. Admittedly,  this is a
rather ad hoc way to obtain heterogeneity in the learning process. However, if we are
ready to admit heterogeneity at least as a feature of a less-than-perfectly informed
population, heterogeneity may then be self-reproducing over time through the
distribution mechanism of profits and losses that we have examined in section 326.
As we saw there, heterogeneity causes some firms in the population to obtain
higher profits than expected, some firms to obtain lower profits than expected, and some
to default. As a consequence, not all firms have the same pressure to revise their
forecasts. It can be argued that the typical "learning agent" in standard learning models
coincides with the firms in the second class only, that is, with only a part of the whole
                                          
24A detailed discussion of different estimation methods can be found in Pesaran (1987) and Sargent
(1993). The problem of convergence of learning to rational expectations equilibria is discussed in a
general framework by Bray-Kreps (1986).
25This seems to be a general problem: as far as I know, learning models ignore the costs of errors, ignore
the actions that rational agents should take to protect themselves against errors, and ignore that errors can
be fatal (economically) to an agent (see also Tamborini, 1997).
26If, during the learning process, the average expected price does not coincide with the acutal price, the
distribution of profits and losses results to be different quantitatively, but the bankruptcy mechanism
remains the same as explained in section 3.
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population. In principle, the firms in the first class, too, should be incentivated to
forecast better, because their expected price turns out be lower than the actual one and
hence their output is inefficiently low. However, it should be recalled that the
distribution mechanism of profits and losses in the economy is such that as a firm
approaches the "average firm's" correct forecast, profits shrink towards the zero average
profit condition. Hence, the firms in the first class may have little, if any, incentive to
change their forecasts27. As to the defaulting firms, the problem is simply whether they
will have another chance or not. In the present simplified setup they will not, which
implies that at the end of each period  t, the population of firms changes its structure of
cumulated information, in the sense that the information embodied in the defaulting
firms dies out. This of course remains true also in a more realistic economy where only
some defaulting firms actually go bankrupt. Since the thrust of learning models is the
cumulation of information, as exemplified above, the critical consequence of
bankruptcies is that they destroy information in the population as a whole. We can
safely ignore this problem only if some informational device exists that freely transmits
the information owned by the defaulting firms to the entering ones. Otherwise, the
latter's forecasts will change the distribution of expected prices in the population. Thus,
the different attitudes towards learning of the firms in the different classes, and possibly
the structural changes in the distribution of expected prices due to the turnover of firms,
may justify the persistence of heterogeneity in the population - and perhaps may make
the idea of homogeneity less justifiable.
The eventuality of bankruptcy in a learning population, and the consequent
injection of "less learned" newcomers, can also be linked to the research line on
heterogeneity of Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985, 1989), which may shed light on the
implied structural change in the distribution of expected prices.  Their works investigate
the aggregate consequences of agents' different abilities to obtain and process
information. They usually partition the population in two simple classes - the
"sophisticated" and the "naive" - and examine under what conditions the latter are able
to alter the aggregate equilibrium outcome with respect to what it would be if all agents
were sophisticated.  The learning process depicted above quite naturally reproduces, in
any period t of the process,  the Haltiwanger-Waldman partition of the population of
                                          
27In a paper examining the performance of professional exchange-rate forecast services, Bilson (1983)
deals with a similar problem, which is known as "the right side of the market problem". In valuing
forecast services, the customers are not interested in the precision of the forecast, but in its profitability. A
small forecast error with the wrong sign (e.g. leading to a long position in foreign exchanges when the
exchange rate instead appreciates) produces a loss, whereas a larger error with the right sign yields a gain
anyway.
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firms. Suppose that all firms adopt the learning process described by equations (4.3)-
(4.4) up to an individual "white-noise" uncorrelated component. Consequently, in each
period t there exists a distribution of expected prices in the population of firms such that
in the next period t+1 a share Γt of the population goes bankrupt as explained in section
3.  Each period t, therefore, is characterized by a class of size (1 -  Γt-1) of
"sophisticated firms" - which know equations (4.3)-(4.4) - and a class of size Γt-1  of
new "naive firms" - which, say, start from scratch. If qe(t)st+1 is the expected inflation
rate of the sophisticated firms, and qe(t)nt+1 is that of the naive ones, the resulting
average expected price will be:
(4.7) qe(t)t+1 = (1 -  Γt-1 )qe(t)st+1 + Γt-1qe(t)nt+1
This expression is an example of the structural change in the distribution of
expectations, and of the permanence of heterogeneity, due to the turnover of firms
mentioned above. Moreover, since the actual inflation rate will depend on (4.7), the
turnover of firms also modifies the inflation-generating process. This further tightens
the requirements for convergence of the learning process. On the other hand, if a
convergent learning process (of the sophisticated firms) exists, this, as we know, implies
limt→∞ Γt = 0, and limt→∞ qe(t)t+1 = qe(t)st+1. Therefore, it seems that, if the
sophisticated discover a convergent learning process, the influence of the naive on the
macroeconomic results is transitory (in the long run all the firms are sophisticated).
Note, however, that the sophisticated firms in this example are in fact
"boundedly rational" in the sense explained previously: they are clever information
processors, but have limited understanding of the inflation generating process and of the
bankruptcy mechanism. Were firms sophisticated in the Haltwanger-Waldman sense of
being fully informed on the structure of the economy, including the bankruptcy
mechanism, they would  at any time exploit equation (4.7) to  know the population's
average expectation, which,  if the rational expectation  qe(t)st+1 = qe(t)t+1 is to hold,
clearly implies qe(t)t+1 = qe(t)nt+1. That is to say, it is rational for the fully informed
firms to adopt the expected price of the naive firms. This is a paradoxical result of
"over-sophistication" that confirms Haltwanger-Waldman's claim that the effect of the
presence of the naive, however few,  may be magnified by the behaviour of the
sophisticated28.
The foregoing considerations on learning lead to the conclusion that in a truly
atomistic information structure, the convergence of heterogeneous individual
                                          
28In Haltiwanger-Waldman's taxonomy, this effect occurs in the presence of strategic complementarity
(or synergetic effects) between the actions of the two classes of agents. This is indeed our case, since the
default probability for each and all firms decreases as individual expectations come closer to the average.
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expectations towards a common value, and possibly the convergence of this common
value to the rational expectations equilibrium, are by no means obvious phenomena. On
the other hand, the presence of limited information or of boundedly rational firms in the
sense used above may help explain the apparent stability of the distribution of price
forecasts for relatively long periods of time, and may also lend support to the view that
in highly complex environments limits to the degree of "soiphistication" in information
processing and decision making may actually favour stability.
5. Conclusions
By bringing together the essential features of a wide array of models of
imperfect capital markets in a highly stylized model of a sequential credit economy, we
have seen that the functioning of the macro-economy is significantly affected by factors
that usually do not appear in models in the Walrasian, or even the Keynesian, tradition,
such as the time profile of transactions, the characteristics of contracts among agents,
the way in which money is obtained, the peculiar constraint that debt contracts impose
on firms. In particular, we have examined macroeconomic equilibria in which two key
"financial factors" -the interest rate on bank loans and the related bankruptcy risk- affect
employment, output and the price level.
The paper has also focused on some methodological issues arising in connection
with the treatment of heterogeneous price expectations and bankruptcy in
macroeconomic analysis.
First, heterogeneous price expectations may be seen as a consequence of
dropping the assumption of information as a free good and replacing it with a partition
between private and public information. We have then seen that heterogeneous price
expectations, with a given statistical distribution in the economy, are sufficient to
generate a bankruptcy mechanism in the economy.
Second, the problem with plugging the probability of bankruptcy into the firm's
optimization programme is how the latter  can come to know the probability laws that
govern bankruptcy in the economy. At the partial equilibrium level of analysis of most
models one might think of the probability of bankruptcy as an exogenous parameter on
which the firm expresses a subjective belief. Yet in a  general-equilibrium macro-
context one expects bankruptcy to be related to some endogenous variables to some
extent. The bankruptcy mechanism generated by the economy analyzed in this paper is
not trivially detectable at the individual level because it hinges on i) the dependence of
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the actual output price on the average expected price, ii) the variance of the distribution
of the expected prices in the economy. In other words, knowing the bankruptcy
mechanism requires knowing the first two moments of the distribution of the expected
prices of all other firms. I have called this "systemic information" as opposed to the
firms' own "atomistic information".
Third, assuming common knowledge of the bankruptcy mechanism would
therefore imply  an even stronger informational requirement than in the standard
rational expectations hypothesis, which is generally limited to publicly observable
variables and to the first moment of their distributions. I have also put forward a few
preliminary considerations about the possibility of by-passing the bankruptcy
mechanism through learning to forecast the correct price (or inflation rate). The problem
of learning in a heterogeneous population including the eventuality of bankruptcy is, to
my knowledge, almost absent in the literature. After considering the learning procedures
presently available in economic analysis, my conclusion has been that the fact that firms
may go bankrupt, and that this may well be related to errors during the learning process,
generates a complex population dynamics which makes convergence to the rational
expectations equilibrium even less clear than is currently found in studies based on
homogenous populations with no bankruptcy.
This conclusion, it should be stressed again, derives from the assumption of
strict "atomistic information" not publicly available. This seems theoretically justified in
a private ownership economy, whereas in reality some "systemic information" does
circulate at negligible, if not zero, cost. An example repeatedly met above is business
surveys, which are regularly diffused through the mass media. Public agencies such as
statistical institutes, the government or the central bank also disseminate information on
price expectations. Nonetheless, business surveys themselves reveal a remarkable
presistence of heterogeneous price expectations over time, even in quite stable periods.
Though one may think that this phenomenon is only a remote cause of bankruptcy in
real economies, it still remains a fact challenging the principle that rational agents
should exploit all available information. However, this fact also challenges the
traditional view of the opponents to the rational expectations hypothesis inspired by
Keynes's "beauty-contest" parable. In Keynes's view  individuals i) feel ignorant about
the future and are therefore prone to follow the mass' average opinion, ii) are aware of
the self-referential nature of the market (which makes the behaviour under i) rational in
the context), iii) they do engage in detecting the average market expectations. It is well-
known that Keynes had in mind the modus operandi of financial markets, and he and
many others after him (see e.g. Shiller, 1989, as a most recent and influential example)
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found evidence of the "beauty contest" effect in episodes of  sudden coagulations of
rising or falling expectations, rarefaction of exchanges, and consequently bewildering
fluctuations of prices. This  picture is markedly different from the one emerging here
and from business surveys, where instead the relevant agents place high confidence in
their own forecasts, are almost unaware of the self-referential component of inflation,
and their expectations remain quite steadily distributed around the mean. It is perhaps
not by chance that manufactured goods prices are far less volatile than financial prices.
Yet understanding the reasons for these differences in the attitude towards the formation
of expectations in different economic environments is still another open issue.
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Figure 1. The firms' operation stages
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Figure 3. Heteregeneous expectations and bankruptcy probability
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